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of the French Aphorism: 
La Rochefoucauld and Nietzsche 
MARION FABER 
At first glance an attempt to relate the seventeenth-century 
French aristocrat Due Fran~ois de Ia Rochefoucauld, darling of the 
salon, to the late nineteenth-century German thinker and self-pro­
claimed prophet Friedrich Nietzsche might seem almost absurd. 
Yet these two men are in fact linked in literary history, both by 
virtue of the documented influence of the one on the other and more 
specifically for their use of a particular literary genre: the aphorism. 
I hope in this essay to explore the impact that La Rochefoucauld's 
work had on Nietzsche and Nietzsche's transformation of the French 
aphorism as he found it in La Rochefoucauld into a structure uniquely 
suited to his philosophical purposes, a structure that Sarah Kofman 
could call "l'ecriture meme de Ia volonte de puissance."1 
The aphorism is a genre that goes back to classical times, Theognis, 
Hippocrates, and Seneca being among its main practitioners. Despite 
lexicographical distinctions among sentence, maxim, apothegm, and 
aphorism, the form has been defined rather loosely; certainly Renais­
sance scholars did not differentiate very strictly. 2 La Rochefoucauld, 
the author of Reflexions diverses and Memoires, is known chiefly 
for his Sentences et Maximes, the definitive edition of which was 
published in 1678. It contains 519 aphorisms, or maxims, sometimes 
grouped around certain key topics, but without any division into 
sections or subgroupings. A work that gained immediate admiration 
in its time and that was also held in high esteem in the eighteenth 
century, the Sentences et Maximes were in Nietzsche's day generally 
considered only a product of the salon and thus superficial, trivial, 
and not worthy of the consideration of any serious student of 
philosophy. But Nietzsche was one of La Rochefoucauld's chief 
admirers in the nineteenth century and was largely responsible for a 
renewed interest in him, an interest that the twentieth century has 
sustained. 
To assess La Rochefoucauld's effect on Nietzsche, I will focus on 
one particular work by Nietzsche, Menschliches Allzumenschlz"ches. 
Comparative Literature Studies 
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206 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE STUDIES 
Written between 1876 and 1878, this work marks a crucial turning 
point in Nietzsche's career, a tum away from the romanticism of 
Schopenhauer and Wagner. As we shall see, La Rochefoucauld's 
work played a decisive role at this critical time in his life. 
Until this point, the prodigious young professor of classical philol­
ogy at the University of Basel had for years been very much under 
the influence of Schopenhauer and Wagner, in both biographical and 
philosophical senses. Since discovering the work of Schopenhauer in 
his adolescence, Nietzsche had treasured that pessimistic philosophy 
in an emotional way, identifying strongly with Schopenhauer's 
persona as melancholy Einzelg(mger. In addition, Richard Wagner 
had been Nietzsche's hero; Nietzsche had visited him regularly at his 
home in Tribschen, forming a quasi-amorous attachment to Wagner's 
wife Cosima, and seeing in Wagner a kind of ersatz father (Nietzsche's 
own father had died when he was eight years old). This relationship 
saw Nietzsche playing the son's role, however unconsciously, becom­
ing a virtual disciple of The Great Man, and furthering Wagner's 
artistic aims. To this end he changed Die Geburt der Tragodie aus 
dem Geist der Musik, his first major work, to include a long section 
hailing Wagner's operas as the long-awaited rebirth of Greek tragic 
art. 
But in 1876 Nietzsche broke with Wagner, again both on personal 
and philosophical levels. After attending the Bayreuth Festival in 
August 1876, he was no longer ready to stand like a factotum await­
ing Wagner's commands. His own large ego could no longer tolerate 
such a dependent, subservient position. He also came to see Wagner's 
art, not as revolutionary, but as decadent, death-loving, life-denying 
romanticism. After Bayreuth, contact between the two men was 
never reestablished, and members of Wagner's circle considered 
Menschliches Allzumenschliches, published in 1878, as no less than 
a betrayal. 
A new friend and new philosophical stimulant had entered the pic­
ture in the person of Paul Ree, psychologist and the author of Psy­
chologische Beobachtungen, which Nietzsche had read in Basel in 
1873, the year of its publication. The German Jew and Nietzsche 
entered into a friendship, which surely antagonized the anti-Semitic, 
nationalistic Wagnerites and which meant a new, positivistic orienta­
tion for Nietzsche. 
It was at Ree's suggestion that Nietzsche began to read La Roche­
foucauld, whom Ree admired enormously. In the fall of 1876, when 
Nietzsche and Ree traveled to Sorrento, Nietzsche read La Roche­
foucauld's Sentences et Maximes on the train. 3 In Sorrento, Nietzsche 
and Ree lived at the villa of Malwida von Meysenbug, where they 
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FABER 207 
enjoyed long uninterrupted days of talking together and writing. It 
was here that the first pages of MenschHches Allzumenschliches were 
written. (These pages constitute the second section of the work; the 
first section, metaphysical observations, had been written earlier and 
was later incorporated as the first section of the completed work.) 
In the first sections of his new work, the first work of his coming 
of age as a philosopher, Nietzsche immediately credits La Rochefou­
cauld with being his inspiration. Like the Frenchman, he too will 
now try his hand at "Sentenzen-Schleiferei" (A ph. 35 ), and he 
rebukes presentday readers who do not realize how difficult it is to 
write within the constraints of this form. La Rochefoucauld and his 
contemporaries are for Nietzsche "scharf zielende Schutzen, welche 
immer und immer wieder ins Schwarze treffen-aber ins Schwarze 
der menschlichen Natur" (Aph. 36). And indeed, Menschliches 
Allzumenschliches is the first of Nietzsche's works written in the 
aphoristic style, the style that he had admired in La Rochefoucauld 
and that was to become inextricably associated with Nietzsche's 
thinking. 
Nowhere, then, is the influence of La Rochefoucauld as clear as 
in this pivotal work of Nietzsche's, the most Gallic of all his writing. 
Thus it is well suited for an examination of how Nietzsche trans­
forms the French aphorism into his own vehicle. What about the 
aphorism attracts him to it at this particular point in his life? What 
does he do to change the aphorism to fit his own, unfettered philos­
ophy of the forenoon? 
Four main characteristics of La Rochefoucauld's work can, I 
believe, explain Nietzsche's strong initial attraction to it: 
First, and most obvious, the Maximes are a psychological work 
par excellence. As Nietzsche stated in the quotation above, man's 
nature is penetrated again and again by La Rochefoucauld's literary 
arrows. The view of man is materialistic, a psychological investiga­
tion of motivation and behavior. There are no metaphysical or reli­
gious definitions of man (although in his posthumous aphorisms La 
Rochefoucauld did concern himself with religion). Neither is the 
heroic vision of man found in his contemporaries Racine and Comeille 
asserted in the Maximes. This demystifying thrust corresponds well 
to Nietzsche's intentions at this time. 
Second, another obvious aspect of La Rochefoucauld's work is 
that it is not systematic in any strict sense. Many of us who would 
never think to make our way through seventeenth century French 
essays have nevertheless browsed with pleasure through La Roche­
foucauld, savoring provocations and putdowns, mulling them over, 
and going on. True, there are groups of maxims more or less the-
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208 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE STUDIES 
matically related, but one can turn to any page of La Rochefoucauld 
and find several well-defined, autonomous nuggets of truth or bits 
of thought for rumination. 
The ideological consequence of such a form must, I believe, 
also have been attractive to Nietzche, for an ostensibly casual collec­
tion of truths corresponds exactly to Nietzsche's philosophical 
position at this time. His idealistic predecessors in philosophy had 
conceived the search for truth as the construction of a system for 
explaining the world_ One cannot tum to any page in Kant or Hegel 
and expect to find a self-sufficient thought, for all is conceived as a 
great, interdependent system. Schopenhauer, although he was also a 
consummate aphorist, is in his Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819) 
the last of the systematic philosophers. 
At this period in his career, Nietzsche was rejecting Schopenhauer 
and with him the idea that there can be One Truth which is revealed 
by one philosophy_ Now he is more concerned with the "kleinen 
unscheinbaren Wahrheiten" (Aph. 3), scientific truths that can with­
stand any disputing. In terms of metaphysical systems, Nietzsche is 
nihilistic: the unsystematic form of the aphoristic work is perhaps 
the only one truly able to reflect this anti-systematic ideology of the 
Nietzsche of 1876. For him, it must have seemed the only honest 
form for his philosophy. 
Third, La Rochefoucauld's maxims are like the tip of an iceberg of 
thought. As is well known, they are the result of countless rework­
ings to achieve the greatest brevity and bite, shocking apen;:us which 
leave the preliminary underpinnings of each thought unstated. This 
aspect of the maxims must also have been attractive to Nietzsche the 
artist, for unlike his philosophical predecessors, Nietzsche was not 
only a philosopher, but a poet as well, and surely valued the aes­
thetic satisfaction of a formulation no less than its content (given 
that the two can be separated). His image of the cameo to describe 
La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms (Aph. 35) indicates his aesthetic ori­
entation, his assessment of the maxims as delicate and difficult works 
of art. Thus he is drawn to La Rochefoucauld as much for the beauty 
of his literary style as for his psychological acumen. 
In addition to these three characteristics, there is a fourth aspect, 
one related to the first: the moral focus of La Rochefoucauld's work. 
He is a moraliste in the French sense, observing the mores of his soci­
ety; but beyond that, he is a moralist in the English sense, analyzing 
the moral structure of that society, its alleged virtues and vices. 
Nietzsche, of course, is above all a moralist, a moralist of the indi­
vidual, struggling already in this seminal work with the concepts of 
good and evil as applied to man. 
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To illustrate the evolution in the moral evaluations of the two 
writers, their conclusions about the moral nature of man, I shall dis­
cuss two pairs of aphorisms. The comparison also clarifies some 
fundamental stylistic differences. 
The first pair of aphorisms concerns gratitude. La Rochefoucauld's 
298th maxim is: "La reconnaissance de la plupart des hommes n'est 
qu'une secrete envie de recevoir de plus grands bienfaits." 
Nietzsche writes in his 44th aphorism: 
Danlcbarlceit und Rache.-Der Grund, weshalb der Machtige dankbar 
ist, ist dieser. Sein Wohltater hat sich durch seine Wobltat an der 
Sphare des Machtigcn gleichsam vergriffcn und sich in sie cinge­
drangt: nun vergreift er sich zur Vergeltung wieder an der Sphare des 
Wohltaters durcb den Akt dcr Dankbarkeit. Es ist eine mildcre Form 
der Rache. Ohne die Genugtuung der Dankbarkeit zu haben, wiirde 
der Machtige sich unmachtig gezeigt haben und fiirderhin dafiir 
gelten. Deshalb stellt jede Gesellschaft der Guten, das beisst ur­
spriinglich der Machtigen, die Dankbarkeit unter die ersten Pflichten. 
-Swift hat den Satz hingeworfen, dass Menschen in demselben 
Verhii.ltnis dankbar sind, wie sie Rache hegen. 
Although La Rochefoucauld's work includes passages longer than 
this maxim and Nietzsche's work has many aphorisms shorter in 
length, both examples are typical of their authors. La Rochefoucauld's 
519 aphorisms rarely exceed two sentences, although he did set a 
long aphorism on self-love at the beginning of his first edition of the 
Maximes. Approximately one quarter of Nietzsche's work is made up 
of one-liners, but in a later work like Jenseits von Gut und Bose he 
confines these to a separate section (Part 4) called "Spriiche und 
Zwischenspiele." His preferred length is the short paragraph, as in the 
above aphorism. To use traditional terminology, La Rochefoucauld 
prefers the paradoxical aphorism, whereas Nietzsche prefers the dis­
cursive aphorism in the tradition of Hippocrates and Bacon. Or, as 
Franz Mautner formulates it, 4 La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms are 
constructed on the principle of "Einfall," that is, the simulation in 
one pithy statement of an inspired idea, whereas Nietzsche's more 
often grow from the principle of "Klarung," that is, the intention to 
clarify and lay out a matter in a definitive, satisfying way. (In Men­
schHches Allzumenschliches, it is also characteristic of Nietzsche to 
include at the end of his paragraphs a summary sentence that could 
almost stand by itself as an aphorism of "Einfall": for example, after 
a paragraph about our dubious knowledge of any metaphysical 
world, Nietzsche writes (Aph. 9): "Ware die Existenz einer solchen 
Welt noch so gut bewiesen, so stiinde doch fest, dass die gleichgiil­
tigste aller Erkenntnisse eben ihre Erkenntnis ware: noch gleichgiil-
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210 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE STUDIES 
tiger als dem Schiffer in Sturmesgefahr die Erkenntnis von der 
chemischen Analysis des Wassers sein muss."; or, after a paragraph 
on social justice (Aph. 451): "Wenn man der Bestie blutige Fleisch­
stucke aus der Nahe zeigt und wieder wegzieht, his sie endlich 
briillt; meint ihr, dass dies Gebriill Gerechtigkeit bedeute?") 
But to return to the subject at hand: In addition to differences of 
length in these two aphorisms there is the different explanation for 
gratitude offered by each writer. As always, both authors are dis­
abusing us of our illusions: in this case, that gratitude is as pure, self­
less, or straightforward as it would seem. But La Rochefoucauld 
emphasizes in gratitude the human desire to be self-seeking, to 
advance oneself, as by flattery. Egoism (l'amour-propre) is at the 
root of La Rochefoucauld's psychology of man, and gratitude is one 
manifestation of it, a means to use others to gain one's advantage. 
In other aphorisms about gratitude, he likens it to a kind of money, 
paid in the hope of making better loans in the future (223); or he 
stresses the role of pride in agreeing on the price of the transaction 
(225 ). La Rochefoucauld's life as an aristocrat close to the court 
of Louis XIV is surely part of the reason for this particular psy­
chological insight into gratitude. 
Like La Rochefoucauld, Nietzsche is exposing a secret reason 
for gratitude; he does not accept it at face value, but seeks a psycho­
logical explanation more true than the obvious one. But his meta­
phor is derived neither from the search to find favor with a monarch 
nor from commercial trading. Nor is self-love or pride particularly 
salient here. Rather Nietzsche, in an anticipation of his theory of 
the will to power, uses territorial metaphors of attack, of power 
struggles, to interpret what we call gratitude. The powerful man has 
been weakened by a kindness. By his gratitude he avenges himself on 
his benefactor, showing his own power and thus demonstrating that 
gratitude and revenge-normally conceived as opposites-are fun­
damentally similar. 
This is not only an example of the paradoxical element in the 
aphorisms of both writers (gratitude"" greed, gratitude= revenge), 
but it is also an example of the new monistic tendency in Nietzsche's 
philsophy, which resists dualistic explanations, seeking rather in both 
metaphysical and moral terms a monistic description of human 
behavior. 
Other of Nietzsche's aphorisms dealing with gratitude likewise 
conceive it in terms of weak and strong, of nobility of nature rather 
than of egoism per se. Tabling the question of the influence of a 
Bismarckian Zeitgeist on his analyses, we can at least speculate 
that such a psychology of gratitude may be partially attributed to 
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Nietzsche's conception of his own life as struggle, a struggle with 
himself, with his illness, with his contemporaries. Overcoming (an 
assertion of power) is at the root of much of his philosophy, and 
all is examined in this light. Characteristic in this regard is how 
Nietzsche improves La Rochefoucauld in his 50th aphorism. La 
Rochefoucauld had analyzed people's need for pity as their "stu­
pidity" in a misfortune. But Nietzsche sees pity as more than mere 
stupidity: it is a covert use of power, the power to make others feel 
bad, the power to hurt. This interpretation is especially significant, as 
it refutes Schopenhauer's exaltation of pity as the highest moral 
feeling. 
Nietzsche's aphorism is also distinguished from La Rochefoucauld's 
by its historical orientation. In the phrase "jeder Gesellschaft der 
Guten, das heisst urspriinglich der Machtigen," there is an indication 
of Nietzsche's invariable genealogical approach to subjects under 
investigation, whether metaphysical, religious, aesthetic, or moral. 
This historical approach both goes beyond La Rochefoucauld's, 
which never concerns itself with life outside its particular time, place, 
and society; and at the same time it exposes the false universality 
of La Rochefoucauld's apodictic statements by insisting on the evo­
lution of every kind of behavior or conviction. When we read La 
Rochefoucauld, we seem to be in a universe of eternal cubbyholed 
qualities, vices and virtues. As La Bruyere described them, La Roche­
foucauld's maxims seem to be "des lois dans Ia morale."5 No allow­
ance is ever made for diversity or change due to social class, histori­
cal period, or geography. True, he uses phrases like "n'est souvent 
que" and "Ia plupart des hommes" to qualify his assertions and allow 
for deviation from his norm. But no reader remembers the quibble: 
his aphorisms preclude argument; they have the ring of the absolute. 
Who will ever remember that gratitude is greedy ambition in "Ia 
plupart des hommes" and consider seriously that minority for whom 
it is not? In tracing the evolution of our world in his discursive 
aphorisms, Nietzsche undercuts this closed, irrefutable impact of the 
aphoristic form as La Rochefoucauld uses it. 
As a related example of this phenomenon, we may consider 
another pair of aphorisms, this one concerning self-deception. La 
Rochefoucauld writes: "Nous sommes si accoutumes a nous deguiser 
aux autres qu'enfin nous nous deguisons a nous memes" (119). This 
again has the ring of the absolute. Our deception of others by assum­
ing disguises goes so far that it ultimately includes self-deception 
and we keep our true nature even from ourselves. Such a thought 
assumes that there is a "real nature," but one which remains unknown 
to the subject in question. A similar aphorism states: "Dans toutes 
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212 COMPARATIVE LITERATURE STUDIES 
les professions chacun affecte une mine et un exterieur pour paraitre 
ce qu'il veut qu'on le croie. Ainsi on peut dire que le monde n'est 
compose que de mines" (256). 
These thoughts may at first seem downright Nietzschean. Nietz­
sches love of masks has been well documented; as a writer he likes to 
assume various personae to carry his ideas forward. But in Men­
schliches Allzumenschliches Nietzsche writes of self-deception in the 
following manner: 
Wie der Schein zum Sein wird.-Der Schauspieler kann zuletzt auch 
beim ticfsten Schmerz nicht aufhoren, an den Eindruck seiner 
Person und den gesamten szenischen Effekt zu denken, zum Beispiel 
selbst beim Begrabn~~ seines K.indes; er wird iiber seinen eigenen 
Schmerz und dessen Ausserungen weinen, als sein eigener Zuschauer. 
Der Heuchler, welcher immer ein und dieselbe Rolle spielt, hort 
zuletzt auf, Heuchler zu sein; zum Beispiel Priester, welche als junge 
Manner gewohnlich bewusst oder unbewusst Heuchler sind, werden 
zuletzt natiirlich und sind dann wirklich, ohne aile Affektation, 
eben Priester; oder wenn es der Vater nicht soweit bringt, dann 
vielleicht der Sohn, der des Vaters Vorsprung benutzt, seine Ge­
wohnung erbt. Wenn einer sehr lange und hartnackig etwas scheinen 
will, so wird es ihm zuletzt schwer, etwas anderes zu sein. Der Beruf 
fast jedes Menschen, sogar des Kiinstlers, beginnt mit Heuchelei, 
mit einem Nachmachen von aussen her, mit einem Kopieren des 
Wirkungsvollen. Der, welcher immer die Maske freundlicher Mienen 
tragt, muss zuletzi eine Gewalt iiber wohlwollende Stimmungen 
bekommen, ohne welche der Ausdruck der Freundlichkeit nicht zu 
erzwingen ist,-und zuletzt wieder bekomrnen diese iiber ihn Gewalt, 
er ist wohlwoltend. (Aph. 51) 
Here the aphorism is not launched from the premise of a fixed, 
incontrovertible "real nature" which disguises itself from itself. 
Nietzsche's relativism is evident in this aphorism, for seeming actu­
ally becomes being. The external is all there is; the present is the 
result of an evolution and is itself in flux. (In the fourth section of 
Menschliches Allzumenschliches art too is seen as a process, rather 
than as an unchanging product of perfection.) We might say that 
Nietzsche's paradoxical conviction goes even deeper than La Roche­
foucauld's: the phenomenon is the noumenon. 
In yet another sense as well, La Rochefoucauld tills the ground 
where Nietzsche will plant new seeds. La Rochefoucauld's psycho­
logically penetrating, but ultimately neutral or pessimistic vision of 
the human condition does acknowledge that ideal virtue, true love, 
true friendship might exist, but the overwhelming force of the collec­
tion is that the world is a place where amour-propre dominates, 
where commerce and self interest are the chief motivations and kind-
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ness, generosity, humility, and all the other so-called virtues are in 
actuality (and regrettably) means to further one's own interest. The 
attributes of civility and self-knowledge are all that remain unscathed. 
Egoism, in short, is at the center of all human activity. His last aphor­
ism, longer than any of the others in the collection, concerns death 
and the inability of anyone in society to despise it truly. As a briefer 
aphorism states: "Le solei} ni Ia mort ne se peuvent regarder fixe­
ment" (26). By concluding with this long aphorism on death, he 
gives his collection a decidedly nihilistic cast. 
Just as our reading of Nietzsche has been altered by virtue of our 
knowledge of the subsequent thought of Sigmund Freud, so our 
reading of La Rochefoucauld changes with our knowledge of Nietz­
sche.6 La Rochefoucauld's egoism becomes the springboard for 
Nietzsche's idea of the will to power. In this reaction, Nietzsche 
accepts La Rochefoucauld's insight, but does not draw the same pes­
simistic or nihilistic conclusions. For Nietzsche's aim is not to 
destroy (despite his reputation as the philosopher with a hammer); 
even in Menschl£ches Allzumenschliches, his most negating work, he 
insists on using the aphorism to create a new set of hierarchies to 
accommodate the small, humble truths of human behavior which he 
has discovered. In this sense, the fifth and central section of the 
volume concerns the free spirit, one who takes from out of his criti­
cal perspective a positive attitude, who "dem Herkommen entgegen 
eine ganz individuelle Erkenntnis der Welt zu erwerben trachtet" 
(Ap. 230). 
Why must La Rochefoucauld's insights about egoism be a source 
of dismay? If analysis of human interaction shows that a balance of 
strength is more at its root, then let us affirm that strength, affirm 
egoism. Or, to cite another example, what for La Rochefoucauld are 
the "passions," continually betraying man's reason and leading him 
to goals he had not been able to foresee with his intelligence, become 
in Nietzsche that Dionysian element in art and society, one that 
Nietzsche champions. In this connection, Nietzsche himself com­
ments on his development of the thought of La Rochefoucauld, 
writing in Der Wille zur Macht: "ihm entgegen suchte ich zunachst zu 
beweisen, dass es gar nichts anderes geben konne als Egoismus."7 
Elsewhere, he calls La Rochefoucauld's attitude "Selbstverkleiner­
ung,"8 again rebuking the melancholy aristocrat for unduly low 
self-esteem. 
So, for example, when both Nietzsche and La Rochefoucauld 
agree on the dubious nature of pity, as described above, La Roche­
foucauld will leave it at that. But Nietzsche will go further, taking up 
La Rochefoucauld's insight and setting it in a positive light, in Aphor-
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ism 499, for example, where he states: "Mitfreude, nicht Mitleiden 
macht den Freund." If La Rochefoucauld describes friendship as a 
"commerce ou l'amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose a 
gagner," (83) Nietzsche in Aphorism 376 again goes further, writing 
"Indem wir uns selbst erkennen und unser Wesen selber als eine 
wandelnde Sphare der Meinungen und Stimmungen ansehen, und 
somit ein wenig geringschatzen lernen, bringen wir uns wieder ins 
Gleichgewicht mit den iibrigen .... Und so wollen wires miteinander 
aushalten, da wir es ja mit uns aushalten .... Feinde, es gibt keinen 
Feind .... " 
We see then in La Rochefoucauld a step in the direction of that 
proposed intellectual liberation described in Also sprach Zarathustra 
as the three transformations of the spirit. La Rochefoucauld, we 
might say, is ready to achieve the freedom of the lion, but never 
goes that far; he does not affirm the negative truths he has discovered. 
Why not? La Rochefoucauld makes no attempt to use his aphor­
isms as other than a collection of apen;:us. As Jean Starobinski writes, 
"C'est n'est pas une morale en systeme."9 We have after reading 
them a portrat"t of man and his society, or, to return to Nietzsche's 
image, a series of cameo portraits, and that is the end of it. But in 
reading Nietzsche one has the feeling, even from the beginning in this 
first emancipatory collection, Menschliches Allzumenschliches, that 
the aphorisms are not there simply to paint a portrait: rather-for all 
his rejection of systems, metaphysical or moral-one has the feeling 
that Nietzsche's aphorisms are in the service of a theory of man. And 
in fact later aphoristic works do indeed pile stone upon stone in the 
service of a theory fully-if cryptically-articulated in that aphor­
istic-oracular work Also sprach Zarathustra. 
Thus the metamorphosis in the content of the two aphorists does 
not merely refer back to their particular intellectual historical ori­
entation in time and place, but also reflects that for each, the aphor­
ism is the means to a different end. 
In closing I would like to consider more specifically Nietzsche's 
adoption of the French aphorism in terms of style. The following 
pair of aphorisms on the same theme is an instance of Nietzsche's 
close emulation of his model. 
La Rochefoucauld: "La parfaite valeur est de faire sans temoins ce 
qu'on serait capable de faire devant toutle monde." (216) 
Nietzsche: "Man springt einem Menschen, der ins Wasser fallt, 
noch einmal so gem nach, wenn Leute zugegen sind, die es nicht 
wagen." (Aph. 325) 
What strikes us first about La Rochefoucauld's aphorism is its 
balanced construction: "de faire sans temoins" is balanced by "de 
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fa:ire devant toutle monde." This polar structure is intensified by the 
extreme contrast of "sans temoins" and "tout le monde" (by writing 
not just "un autre" or "des autres," but "toutle monde," La Roche­
foucauld emphasizes the grand spectacle involved in the second form 
of action). In addition, that world of absolute but inaccessible vir­
tue which we discussed earlier in regard to the maxim concerning 
self-deception is also evident here, for the implication is that perfect 
bravery might exist, but no one actually does without witnesses that 
which the presence of witnesses makes hypothetically possible. Con­
tinuing the paradoxical thought, mere bravery equals lack of bravery 
equals exhibitionism. In formulating his observation as a definition, 
La Rochefoucauld reveals that the language of the absolute in the 
everyday world is empty of meaning. (Other such examples: love of 
justice (78), gratitude (298), moderation (293), and liberality (263). 
Nietzsche's aphorism also has a polar structure, but the thought, 
although it is essentially the same thought, is not couched as a defi­
nition. It is more of a comparison, again more relativistic. Neither is 
this aphorism as abstract as La Rochefoucauld's: rather than defining 
"perfect bravery," Nietzsche gives a quasi-anecdotal example. This is 
generally true in Nietzsche, who is not out to write an anatomy of 
any kind and who avoids the closed nature of definition. Instead, his 
aphorism shows a more visual use of language. Although it is usually 
the German philosophers who encourage us to consider abstract 
words as having an almost concrete presence (Geist, Freiheit, Freude 
march forward through German philosophy), here it is La Roche­
foucauld who, as Starobinski writes, makes of abstractions "des 
acteurs independents, de petits personnages," 10 entities with lives 
of their own. So strong is this tendency that La Rochefoucauld can 
write: "Quand les vices nous quittent, nous nous flattons de la 
creance que c'est nous qui les quittons" (192). The vices and virtues 
seem to exist apart from the subject itself. 
La Rochefoucauld's abstract language is also extremely constrained 
in its use of metaphor. A conventional word or two generally suf­
fices: death is like the sun (26), fortune is like light (380), the river 
of virtue ends in the sea of self-interest (171). The seventeenth cen­
tury classicist does not go far afield to color his writing. In Nietzsche's 
aphorisms, images are more daring: flattery can be a sleeping potion 
(318), people are like corks on the surface of a wave (627); the man 
of action is like a waterfall (488); people are like piles of charcoal 
in the forest (585 ). Reading in retrospect again, we see that it is 
Nietzsche the precursor of the Expressionist poets who introduces to 
the aphorism a palette of color that of course would have been con­
sidered vulgar in seventeenth century France. 
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When Nietzsche tries to write paradoxical aphorisms like Roche­
foucauld's they often fall flat, whereas La Rochefoucauld's rarely do. 
Our previous pair of aphorisms illustrates this point to some degree, 
La Rochefoucauld's being more succinct in expressing the same 
thought. Or: 
Nietzsche on marriage: "Einige Manner haben iiber die Entfiihrung 
ihrer Frauen geseufzt, die meisten dariiber, dass niemand sie ihnen 
entfiihren wollte." (Aph. 388) 
La Rochefoucauld on the same topic: "II y a de bons mariages, 
mais il n'y en point de deiicieux." (113) 
If within the context of German humor Nietzsche's aphorism actu­
ally does seem witty (bad taste and misogyny acknowledged, but dis­
regarded for the moment), it is still clumsy and laboriously phrased 
compared with the graceful brevity of La Rochefoucauld's, whose 
entire wit rests on the one word "de!icieux," used to its fullest 
possible effect. 
In terms of style, then, Nietzsche's brilliance as an aphorist does 
not shine forth when he emulates La Rochefoucauld's paradoxical 
aphorisms most closely. However, to say this is a flaw is to say that 
El Greco would be found wanting if he tried to be Paul Klee. It is 
Nietzsche's expansion of the genre that makes his aphoristic writing 
significant. We have already seen how he uses the genre to present a 
psychology of man in an authentic form, incorporating in addition to 
his historical perspective a broader use of metaphor. Nietzsche also 
widens the range of the aphorism to include subjects never con­
sidered by La Rochefoucauld. In Menschliches Allzumenschliches 
alone, there are in addition to the moral and social realms that fur­
nished our examples, sections on metaphysics, art, religion, and 
politics. Furthermore, the cynical tone of La Rochefoucauld's aphor­
isms rarely if ever changes, but Nietzsche varies that tone with 
pathos, anecdote, and confession. Unlike La Rochefoucauld, he also 
allows the genre to include the dialectical, allows argument. Where 
La Rochefoucauld twists a knife, Nietzsche hammers at the nailhead 
until it is firmly lodged. 
Nietzsche's emulation of La Rochefoucauld's aphorisms in Men­
schliches Allzumenschliches starts him on his way, but his is a dif­
ferent way, that of a philosopher, not a moraliste, a poet, not an 
ecrivain, an apologist, not an aphorist. He cannot stay put at La 
Rochefoucauld's aphorism, but molds and expands it until it becomes 
the vessel of his thought, a thought that likewise does not stay put 
at the devastating aperc;u, but goes on to question and explore, 
argue and conclude. 
MARION FABER · Swarthmore College 
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